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ABSTRACT 
The Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibit discrimination 
against applicants and employees with disabilities. Following the elements of a prima 
facie claim of discrimination, this legal brief explores the conditions under which obesity 
has been deemed a disability. Although obesity is not generally considered a disabling 
impairment, plaintiffs have successfully brought obesity-related claims based on 
a rarely implicated definition of disability. The so-called regarded as definition protects 
those who are not substantially limited by any condition but are subjected to discrimination 
based on the perception that they are limited by a physical or mental impairment. 
Although employers have faired well in such obesity-related discrimination claims, a 
review of federal case law suggests that public human-resource managers are advised to 
adopt a strategy that reduces the likelihood of obesity-related discrimination, as it is 
more desirable to avoid potentially litigious behavior than to emerge victorious in court. 
 
  
The obesity epidemic1 is not only a public health or personal lifestyle problem but 
also an issue that has numerous effects on public agencies (Bradbury, 2005). The 
fiscal impact is felt through higher health care costs, as obesity can lead to chronic illnesses 
such as diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, and some cancers (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2004). Indeed, states can attribute more 
than 10% of their Medicaid expenses, and 5% of their overall medical costs, to obesity 
(Lemov, 2004). In addition to fiscal concerns, obesity has personnel and management 
implications. One review found evidence of weight-related discrimination 
“at virtually every stage of the employment cycle, including selection, placement, 
compensation, promotion, discipline, and discharge” (Roehling, 1999, pp. 982-983). 
These findings underscore the relevance of weight-related discrimination to human 
resource managers, as incidents can rise to the level of illegal discrimination if a 
potential or current employee’s obesity constitutes a disability. This analysis of  
federal case law examines obesity-related disability claims under the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 
 
PRIMA FACIE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM 
The Rehabilitation Act and ADA generally prohibit discrimination against handicapped 
or disabled applicants and employees in personnel decisions. More precisely, 
the ADA provides that 
 
no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, 
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. (§12112[a]) 
 
Although the ADA extended coverage from only those programs that receive federal 
funds to employers in all sectors, the two acts rely on similar language to define disability 
and the standards used to make and assess claims of discrimination. For this 
reason, both laws will be relied on interchangeably in the foregoing analysis. 
 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 
(1973), the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting a prima facie case to establish a 
presumption that discrimination has occurred. As it pertains to the ADA, the plaintiff 
must show that he or she (a) suffers from a disability as defined by the ADA, (b) 
is otherwise qualified to perform the job, and (c) was subject to an adverse employment 
action because of the disability (Clemons v. The Big Ten Conference, 1997). If 
a prima facie case is made, the employer must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the action. Finally, the plaintiff must introduce sufficient evidence that the 
employer’s stated reason is merely a pretext for disability discrimination (Ridge v. 
Cape Elizabeth School Dept., 1999). This analysis of obesity as a disability is structured 
according to these prima facie criteria. 
 
 
 
IS OBESITY A DISABILITY? 
The first element of a prima facie case of discrimination is the establishment that 
the plaintiff is disabled. The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more major life activity, a record of such an 
impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment” (§12102[2]). Obesity 
is obviously a physical characteristic; however, federal guidelines define a physical 
impairment as a physiological disorder that affects a major bodily system (29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2[h]). Accordingly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(EEOC) ADA regulations state that “except in rare circumstances, obesity is not considered 
a disabling impairment” (29 C.F.R. §1630.2[j]). 
Numerous plaintiffs have lost their cases on the grounds that their obesity did not 
constitute a disability, and thus they are not afforded protection under the ADA. An 
illustrative example comes from West v. Town of Jupiter Island (2001). The plaintiff 
was acknowledged as overweight; however, the court upheld West’s termination as 
a police officer because he could not specify the life activities that were substantially 
limited by his alleged disability (p. 1301). Indeed, courts have repeatedly upheld the 
use of weight guidelines in personnel decisions as long as such restrictions are bona 
fide occupational requirements (see Andrews v. Ohio, 1997; Francis v. Meriden, 
1997; Tudyman v. United Airlines, 1984). 
 
Morbid obesity, which is a body weight that is twice the norm, has been recognized 
as a disability in fact, thus constituting a “rare circumstance” as per EEOC 
guidelines (see Nedder v. Rivier College, 1996). The most notable case on this point 
is Cook v. Rhode Island (1993), where the court found that the plaintiff’s morbid 
obesity constituted a disability as she “presented expert testimony that morbid obesity 
is a physiological disorder involving a dysfunction of both the metabolic system 
and the neurological appetite-suppressing signal system, capable of causing adverse 
effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems” (p. 23). 
A morbid obesity as disability in fact claim was rejected, however, in Coleman v. 
Georgia Power Comp. (2000) as the plaintiff did not demonstrate that his obesity 
was adversely affecting any major bodily systems, only that he had potential for 
physiological disorders. Other federal courts have tended to afford the plaintiff 
the benefit of the doubt on whether morbid obesity is an actual disability (see 
Connor v. McDonald’s Restaurant, 2003; EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 1996; Fredregill 
v. Nationwide, 1997; Smaw v. Virginia, 1994). 
 
It is important to note that the Cook (1993) court rejected arguments made by the 
defendant-appellant that morbid obesity should not be considered a disability 
because of its mutable and voluntary nature. Mutability means that the condition 
could be reversed and could apply to obesity by losing weight and ridding oneself of 
any related disability. The court found that the physiological damage caused by morbid 
obesity is permanent, even if the degree of obesity is later reduced (p. 24). 
Likewise, the argument that morbid obesity is caused, or at least exacerbated, by voluntary 
conduct was rejected as being clearly inconsistent with the law. Relying on 
the Rehabilitation Act (1973), the court concluded that how an individual became 
impaired is not a relevant issue as “the Act indisputably applies to numerous conditions 
that may be caused or exacerbated by voluntary conduct, such as alcoholism, 
AIDS, diabetes, cancer resulting from cigarette smoking, heart disease resulting 
from excesses of various types, and the like” (p. 24). 
Regarded as Disabled 
Much of the case law on the question of obesity as disability hinges on the third 
definition under the ADA: being regarded as having an impairing disability. The 
Implementing Guidelines of the ADA define being regarded as as follows: 
 
1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life 
activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; 2) has 
a(n) . . . impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the 
attitudes of others toward such impairment; or 3) has none of the impairments defined 
in . . . this section but is treated . . . as having a substantially limiting impairment. (29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2[1]) 
 
The Supreme Court articulated the general rationale for regarded as in School Board 
of Nassau County v. Arline (1987). This notion of disability was designed to protect 
individuals who either are not substantially limited by their condition, or do not have 
any condition, but are subjected to discrimination based on the perception that they 
are limited by a physical or mental impairment (p. 279). This definition of disability 
turns on the perceptions and stereotypes of the employer. As such, “Congress 
acknowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease 
are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment” 
(p. 284). Thus, the perceived disability definition “can be satisfied whether or 
not a person actually has a physical or mental impairment” (Cook, 1993, p. 22). 
 
Although constituting a markedly nonmedical definition of disability, the standards 
for presenting a prima facie case for “regarded as” discrimination under the 
Rehabilitation Act and ADA are unchanged. The burden falls on the plaintiff to 
“allege that the employer believed, however erroneously, that the plaintiff suffered 
from an ‘impairment’ that, if it truly existed, would be covered under the statutes and 
that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff on that basis” (Francis, 1997, 
p. 285). Thus, the plaintiff must show that the employer perceived that a disability 
existed that substantially limited a major life activity. The Cook (1993) court noted 
that “few ‘perceived disability’ cases have been litigated,” thus requiring the court to 
“explore new frontiers” (p. 22). The infrequency of such claims speaks to the difficulty 
of the plaintiff’s burden in demonstrating a prima facie “regarded as” case. 
 
Turning to obesity-related claims, the EEOC directs that obesity should be considered 
a disability in fact only in “rare circumstances.” Numerous plaintiffs have shown, 
however, that their employer regarded their obesity as a disability and discriminated 
against them on that basis. In Connor (2003), the court allowed the claim to proceed 
based on the reasoning that “the issue is not whether Connor’s obesity is related to a 
physiological impairment; rather, the issue is whether McDonald’s perceived Connor’s 
obesity as relating to a physiological impairment” (p. 9). Similarly, Texas Bus Lines 
defended its refusal to hire Arazella Manuel, in part, because her obesity made her 
physically unqualified to perform the duties of a bus driver, even though there were no 
weight-related physical qualifications for the position (EEOC, 1996). A final example 
is Warner v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. (2003), where the plaintiff’s supervisor told 
another worker that Warner was laid off because he was “overweight,” and that his 
obesity was going to lead him to “die on [his] job site” (p. 22329). 
 
The analysis in Nedder (1996) presents a clear example of the complicated 
applicability of obesity to the ADA. Mary Nedder claimed that Rivier College’s 
termination of her contract as an assistant professor was a violation of the ADA 
because her obesity constituted a disability in fact and because the college regarded 
her as disabled. The court ruled that Nedder could not establish a prima facie case as 
to a disability in fact because she failed to show that she was actually substantially 
limited in a major life activity. In the context of repeated comments by supervisors 
that “obese teachers are perceived by students as less disciplined and less intelligent 
and as making unsuitable role models,” the court ruled, however, that the college perceived 
Nedder’s obesity as substantially limiting her ability to teach, and allowed her 
ADA claim to proceed (p. 119). Thus, Nedder’s obesity led to a failed disability in 
fact claim and a successful “regarded as” disabled claim. 
 
Substantially Limits One or More Major Life Activity 
Regardless of which of the three definitions of disability that is relied on in an 
ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must still show that his or her impairment substantially 
limits one or more major life activity. The implementing regulations for the 
ADA define substantially limits as 
 
(i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general 
population can perform; or (ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or 
duration which an individual can perform a major life activity as compared with…the 
average person. (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2[j][1]) 
 
Thus, an impairment may negatively affect an individual’s life without necessarily 
constituting a disability. Factors such as the nature and severity, duration, and longterm 
impact of the impairment must be considered (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2[j][2]). Such 
determinations are inherently made on a case-by-case basis. In Andrews (1997), a 
group of 76 law enforcement officers claimed that their failure to meet job-related 
weight restrictions constituted disability discrimination. The court found that although 
their weight was in excess of the mandated weight limit, such a condition was not 
regarded as an impairment “which is the result of a physiological condition or otherwise 
beyond the range of ‘normal’” (p. 810). Similarly, the Hazeldine v. Beverage 
Media (1997) court found that the plaintiff’s obesity affected her ability to engage in 
everyday activities, forcing her to pace herself when walking and to refrain from strenuous 
physical exercise. Such limitation, however, “is far from the ‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ 
restriction contemplated by the ADA as constituting the rare circumstances in 
which obesity should be considered a disabling impairment” (p. 704). 
 
Significant limitations must affect major life activities, which include “caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 
learning, and working,” although this list is not considered exhaustive (29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2[i]). Most obesity-related claims turn on whether the plaintiff was significantly 
limited in the major life activity of working. As such,ADA regulations require 
a plaintiff to show evidence of being “significantly restricted in the ability to perform 
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average 
person having comparable training, skills, and abilities” (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2[j][3][i]). 
Thus, “the inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial 
limitation in the major activity of working” (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2[j][3][i]). 
Additional factors are the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable 
access and the range of similar and dissimilar jobs from which the individual has 
been disqualified due to the impairment (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2[j][3][ii]). 
 
To be significantly limited in working, the plaintiff must be unable to perform a range 
of jobs, not merely in the one job of the plaintiff’s choosing. This principle came to bear 
in Smaw (1994). Doretha Smaw consistently exceeded the weight limit for state troopers 
and ultimately was demoted to the position of dispatcher. The court reasoned that 
“even if the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that obesity qualifies as a ‘mental or physical 
disability,’ and that working qualifies as a ‘major life activity,’ she must also show 
that her disability ‘substantially limits’ her ability to work” (p. 1474). Her employment 
as a dispatcher effectively negated her claim of being substantially limited in her ability 
to work, as the court found that “the proper scope of Smaw’s occupation is the field of 
law enforcement as a whole” (p. 1475). Absent this standard, 
 
anyone who failed to obtain a job because of a single requirement which may not be 
essential to the job would become a handicapped individual because the employer 
would thus be viewing the applicant’s failure as a handicap. This Court refuses to make 
the term handicapped a meaningless phrase. (Tudyman, 1984, p. 746) 
 
The Nedder (1996) case demonstrates how an employer can regard an employee 
as being substantially limited in his or her ability to work on account of obesity. Here 
the court relied on the following reasoning from the Cook (1993) decision: 
 
Denying an applicant even for a single job that requires no unique physical skills, due 
solely to the perception that the applicant suffers from a physical limitation that would 
keep her from qualifying for a broad spectrum of jobs, can constitute treating an 
applicant as if her condition substantially limited . . . working. (p. 26) 
 
Because Rivier College considered the plaintiff to be “substantially limited in her 
ability to teach, either in the narrow class of jobs of a religious studies professor or 
in the broader range of any teaching position,” Mary Nedder satisfied the prima facie 
burden of demonstrating that she suffers from a disability as defined by the ADA, 
and her claim was allowed to proceed (Nedder, 1996, p. 119). 
 
REMAINING ELEMENTS OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
Having satisfied any of the three definitions of disability, a plaintiff making an 
obesity-related ADA claim must still establish the remaining elements of a prima 
facie case. The plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she is otherwise qualified to perform 
the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation 
for the disability. Although the determination of what functions are essential to a job 
is made largely by the employer, these functions must be job-related and not derived 
arbitrarily (Lee, 2005, p. 216). A similar balance holds for an employer’s assessment 
of a person’s qualifications for a job. Although an employer does not have to be 
“unfailingly correct,” its assessment of a disabled individual must be “objectively 
reasonable” (Cook, 1993, pp. 26-27). As articulated by the Cook (1993) court, “an 
unfounded assumption that an applicant is unqualified for a particular job, even if 
arrived at in good faith, is not sufficient to forestall liability” (p. 27). Consequently, 
the Supreme Court suggests that a fact-specific and individualized inquiry is essential 
to achieving the goal “of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations 
based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear” (School Board, 1987, p. 287). 
 
The now-familiar expectation of reasonable accommodations under the ADA 
applies to the determination of the qualifications of an applicant or employee. 
Implicit in this requirement is that some of the costs of working toward meaningful 
employment opportunities for disabled individuals must be borne by employers 
(Cook, 1993, p. 27). All possible accommodations, however, are not necessarily reasonable: 
“For an accommodation to be reasonable, it must be effective in permitting 
a disabled employee to perform the essential job functions” (McDonald v. Kansas, 
1995, p. 1423). Thus, adjustments to the physical workspace, such as comfortable 
seating arrangements, electric carts, ramps, elevators, lifts, and convenient parking, 
or to the job itself, such as job restructuring and modified work schedules, may be 
reasonable (Cook, 1993, p. 27). Employers are not required to eliminate any of a 
job’s essential functions. In McDonald (1995), the plaintiff asked the state to accommodate 
his obesity by creating a new correctional officer position with duties that 
did not reflect the standard slate performed by other correctional officers. The court 
ruled that “the ADA does not require the employer to create a new position to accommodate 
the disabled worker” and ruled in favor of the defendant (p. 1423). 
 
The final burden of the prima facie case for the plaintiff under the ADA is to show 
that he or she was the subject of an adverse employment action because of the disability. 
The ADA protects a wide range of employment decisions, such as “job application 
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment” 
(§12112[a]). The burden for the plaintiff is to show not merely that he or she 
suffered an adverse employment action but also that the reason for the action was the 
plaintiff’s factual or perceived disability. 
 
In the cases where the plaintiff was able to demonstrate the necessary cause-andeffect 
relationship, the employer expressly cited the obesity of the applicant and/or 
employee as the reason for the adverse employment action. For example, Bonnie 
Cook was denied employment in any capacity at a state-operated medical facility on 
the explicit grounds that her morbid obesity compromised her ability to assist in 
emergency situations and put her at a greater risk for developing serious ailments that 
could lead to absenteeism and worker’s compensation claims (Cook, 1993). Similarly, 
Arazella Manuel was denied employment, in part, because she failed a required physical 
examination due to her morbid obesity. The doctor who conducted the examination 
for Texas Bus Lines concluded that Manuel would not be able to move swiftly in 
an emergency situation (EEOC, 1996). Finally, the plaintiff’s supervisor in Warner 
(2003) confided in another worker that David Warner’s morbid obesity was a “substantive 
factor” in the company’s decision to terminate him (p. 22329). 
 
When an individual with a disability makes a prima facie case for discrimination, 
the employer must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel 
action. The employer does not have to prove this reason but must produce evidence 
that would lead to a conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the 
adverse action (EEOC, 1996, p. 970). Such nondiscriminatory reasons include jobrelated 
weight guidelines that are bona fide occupational requirements (see Andrews, 
1997; Francis, 1997; Tudyman, 1984) and a record of unsatisfactory performance 
evaluations and work-related deficiencies (see Ridge, 1999; West, 2001). In the Cook 
(1993) and EEOC (1996) cases, the defendants cited concerns about the ability of 
the plaintiffs to respond adequately in emergency situations. 
 
The final aspect of the prima facie burden requires the plaintiff to introduce sufficient 
evidence that the employer’s stated reason is merely a pretext for disability 
discrimination. In this way, the burden always remains on the plaintiff to make the 
prima facie case of discrimination. Despite the defendant’s seemingly reasonable 
claim that Bonnie Cook’s morbid obesity “compromised her ability to evacuate 
patients in case of an emergency,” the court rejected this reason as a pretext for disability 
discrimination because “MHRH failed to make specific inquiries into plaintiff’s 
physical abilities and instead relied on generalizations regarding an obese 
person’s capabilities” (Cook, 1993, p. 27). More damning was the court’s basis for 
denying the defendant’s justification for rejecting the plaintiff’s application for a bus 
driver position in EEOC (1996). Texas Bus Lines defended its refusal to hire Arazella 
Manuel, in part, because the company believed that she would not be able to “move 
around swiftly in case of accident” (p. 980). The court found that this argument was 
“without merit” for the simple reason that the controlling regulations “do not address 
the issue of a driver’s ability to handle emergency situations” (p. 980). 
 
STATE LAW 
The preceding legal analysis relied exclusively on federal statutes and federal case 
law. Although few of the cited cases have national enforceability, they will certainly be 
influential as precedent in cases dealing with obesity as a disability. Furthermore, 
plaintiffs’ suits also may contain counts under state disability law, and the federal ruling 
can thereby be considered controlling law in the state where the suit originated. 
Indeed, the following state laws were successfully applied in conjunction with the 
Rehabilitation Act or ADA in the respective cases: the Rhode Island Fair Employment 
Practices Act and Rhode Island Civil Rights of Individual with Handicaps Act in Cook 
(1993); the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act in Polesnak v. R.H. Management 
Systems, Inc. (1997); the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 in Morrow v. City of 
Jacksonville (1996); and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act in Connor 
(2003) and Warner (2003). The court’s ruling in Hazeldine (1997) is particularly noteworthy 
as the plaintiff’s disability claim did not meet the ADA’s prima facie criteria 
but did satisfy the broader definition of disability found in the New York State Human 
Rights Law. 
 
In addition to implications for state law springing from federal court rulings, a 
number of state and local governments offer their own protections from obesityrelated 
discrimination. Michigan is the only state with a law that explicitly prohibits 
employment discrimination on the basis of weight (Michigan Civil Rights Act, 
1977). The cities of San Francisco, California, Washington, D.C., and Santa Cruz, 
California, are among the few local jurisdictions to afford such protections (Carr- 
Ruffino, 2003; Garcia, 2004). In addition, state courts have established legal protections 
for obesity under such general state statutes as the Florida Civil Rights Act, the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, the New York Human Rights Law, and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.2 
MANAGERIAL STRATEGIES 
Of course, claims of discrimination are not always successful. Indeed, Roehling 
(1999) suggested that most of the weight-based discrimination that is likely to be 
occurring would not be considered illegal (p. 1001). If, however, it is more desirable 
to avoid litigious behavior than to emerge victorious in court, public humanresource 
managers are well advised to adopt a strategy that reduces the likelihood 
of obesity-related discrimination. 
 
Garcia (2004) suggested that managers must understand how the ADA and relevant 
state and local laws apply to obesity-related issues. Employers also should 
review all job descriptions to make sure that weight requirements are job-related, 
be respectful toward requests for accommodation from overweight individuals, 
establish expectations of courteous treatment of all employees regardless of personal 
appearance, and educate all employees on what is appropriate conduct toward 
overweight employees. As Roehling (1999) asserted, “managers and supervisors 
who show insensitivity to overweight employees are employers’ worst nightmares” 
(p. 1010). Furthermore, managers should not make generalized assumptions about 
what job functions overweight employees can and cannot accomplish. 
Numerous resources are available to assist managers in their dealings with obesity 
issues. Health departments in 28 states receive federal funding for obesity prevention 
programs (CDC, 2004). Consistent with New York’s Focus On: Overcoming Obesity 
guidebook (Siegel, 2004), employers should help employees fully understand the 
range of obesity-related treatments covered by health care plans and Medicare 
(“Medicare to Cover Some,” 2004). A number of national and international advocacy 
groups have valuable information on their Web sites, notably the International Size 
Acceptance Association, the American Obesity Association, and the National 
Association to Advance Fat Acceptance. 
 
Because overweight employees are more likely to have low morale, which can 
negatively influence the efficiency and effectiveness of the agency, managers should 
reconsider the scope of wellness programs (ComPsych, 2005). Such wellness programs 
typically address eating habits and lifestyles (Berman, Bowman, West, & Van Wart, 
2001). With regard to habits, employers should ensure that nutritional choices are 
available during office parties and in cafeterias and vending machines. Employers 
can also make formal and informal opportunities to encourage health lifestyles. 
Work sites and work schedules can be designed to provide opportunities for regular 
physical activity. Programs that encourage communal exercise, such as walking during 
lunch hours, can help build camaraderie while reinforcing the importance of 
healthy living. Larger agencies could install exercise facilities at the work site or provide 
incentives for employees to join local fitness centers. Such investments can pay 
substantial future dividends in terms of reduced health care costs. 
 
The costs and dangers associated with obesity are very real and can profoundly 
affect the workplace. Proactive efforts by public managers to prevent discriminatory 
behaviors and promote wellness may serve to protect the agency from costly litigation 
while simultaneously addressing morale and motivation issues among all 
affected workers. 
 
NOTES 
1. Although there is some debate as to the full extent of the problem, it is clear that obesity is a 
major and increasingly common public health problem (see Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2004; Stein, 2004). The body mass index (BMI), which is calculated by dividing 
weight by height, is the most commonly accepted measure of obesity, though this, too, is 
controversial (see Campos, 2004; Sturm, Ringel, & Andreyeva, 2004). The three categories of 
BMI results are normal, overweight, and obese. 
2. State court decisions are English v. Philadelphia Electric Company (1982); Gimello v. Agency 
Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. (1991); Greene v. Seminole Electric Cooperative (1997); and 
McDermott v. Xerox Corp. (1985). 
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